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The study of philosophical SËtra works is beset with difficulties. Apart from the 
condensed style, which makes them sometimes difficult to understand even where no 
other problems intervene, we often have reason to suspect that these texts may have 
undergone interpolations and other modifications. In practice this means that, in order to 
understand a SËtra text, we should know as much as possible of its history, of the 
vicissitudes it has undergone from its beginning until today. 
 Such detailed knowledge of the history of individual SËtra texts is not normally 
available. This is the reason why we have to be content, in most cases, with a global 
understanding of the kind of influences that SËtra texts undergo. Here we will 
concentrate on one such influence, viz., the one exerted by the commentary or 
commentaries that accompany them. It is known that SËtra texts are frequently extracted 
from commentaries that contain them. During this process of extraction mistakes can 
easily creep into the SËtra text: a sËtra may be overlooked; or, more probably, a 
statement properly belonging to the commentary may be taken to be a sËtra. Confusions 
of this kind were facilitated by the fact that commentaries of around the middle of the 
first millennium C.E. often fail to contain clear indications as to what is sËtra, and what 
commentary. The use of the so-called Vårttika style could not but add to the confusion.1 
 The extraction of a SËtra text from a commentary could lead to an incorrect result 
in other ways, too. There is evidence to show that commentators of around the middle 
of the first millennium occasionally felt free to comment upon the sËtras in an order 
which deviates slightly from the ‘correct’ one. In itself this need not be looked upon as 
an attempt to change the order of the sËtras. But whatever the intentions of these 
commentators, the effect of such a procedure might very well be that the SËtra text 
which someone else subsequently extracted from such a commentary would have some 
of the sËtras in a modified order. 
 Usually Indian SËtra texts are handed down to us in one single ‘line of descent’, at 
least where their early period is concerned. It is only on rare occasions [666] that we can 
show with certainty that commentators did actually comment upon the sËtras in a 
changed order. There are, however, some clear cases, which I will now present. 
                                                
* I thank T. Tillemans for help and advice. 
1See Bronkhorst, 1992, for a brief survey. 
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 Consider first the Såµkhya Kårikå. This work does not consist of sËtras, but of 
kårikås. A considerable number of more or less early commentaries on it have been 
preserved,2 and the exact chronological relationship between them is not easy to 
determine. 
 The most elaborate and interesting of these commentaries is the Yuktid¥pikå. This 
text is not only interesting from the point of view of its contents. Its form, too, is 
special; it constitutes a perfect example of what I have called the Vårttika style. In the 
present study we are interested neither in its contents nor in its style, but in the manner 
in which it deals with the text it comments upon. 
 The author of the Yuktid¥pikå is aware of the fact that the Såµkhya Kårikå consists 
of kårikås. This we must conclude from his use of the term saptati ‘seventy’, hence 
‘work consisting of seventy kårikås’, to refer to the Såµkhya Kårikå in his introductory 
verses. This same term saptati, along with the term åryå which refers to the metre of the 
work, occurs again in the concluding verses of the Såµkhya Kårikå as they are found, 
and paraphrased, in the Yuktid¥pikå. In spite of this, the Yuktid¥pikå, unlike all other 
surviving commentaries, treats the Såµkhya Kårikå as if it consisted of sËtras, not of 
kårikås.3 It frequently divides the kårikås into smaller parts, which it comments upon 
and refers to as sËtras.4 Indeed, it never gives the slightest hint that these ‘sËtras’ 
together constitute kårikås, so much so that its third Óhnika ends right in the middle of 
the discussion of what we call kårikå 15; the remainder of kårikå 15 is commented upon 
in Óhnika 4. Sometimes sËtra and kårikå coincide; in such cases a whole kårikå can 
actually be referred to as sËtra; an example is kårikå 19, which is called sËtra in its 
discussion in the Yuktid¥pikå (p. 84 l. 7-8).5 Interestingly, on two occasions the ‘sËtras’ 
of the Yuktid¥pikå do not occur in the order of the kårikå concerned, as these latter are 
known from all the other surviving commentaries. 
[667] 
 Consider kårikå 4. This reads, in all the commentaries except the Yuktid¥pikå: 
d®∑†am anumånam åptavacanaµ ca sarvapramåˆasiddhatvåt/ trividhaµ pramåˆam i∑†aµ 
prameyasiddhi˙ pramåˆåd dhi//. The Yuktid¥pikå (p. 29 f.) comments, in this order, on 
the following parts: (i) prameyasiddhi˙ pramåˆåd dhi, (ii) trividhaµ pramåˆam i∑†am, 
(iii) sarvapramåˆasiddhatvåt, (iv) d®∑†am anumånam åptavacanaµ ca. These parts 
                                                
2Solomon (1974) studies eight of them. 
3In this respect the Yuktid¥pikå has parallels in the Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya and Madhyåntavibhåga 
Íåstra; see Bronkhorst, 1992. 
4See, e.g., YD p. 9 l. 10, p. 67 l. 2, p. 98 l. 3. 
5Note that Sadyojyotis' commentary (before 9th century) on the SvåyambhuvasËtrasa∫graha calls the 
verses of this text ‘sËtras’, as does the title itself. According to Filliozat (1991: xvii), the term sËtra here 
"réfère plutôt à la parole d'un être à qui l'on attribue la plus haute autorité". 
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constitute the kårikå, but their order has been reversed. No need to add that in this order 
nothing remains of the åryå metre. 
 In the case of kårikå 4 one might think that the author of the Yuktid¥pikå took this 
kårikå as a single unit, and commented upon its parts in a different order. No such 
position can be maintained in connection with kårikås 6 and 7. These kårikås occur, in 
almost the same form, in all the surviving commentaries, and must therefore be looked 
upon as integral parts of the Såµkhya Kårikå, at least at the time of composition of the 
Yuktid¥pikå. The Yuktid¥pikå has these two kårikås, but it has interposed kårikå 7 
between the first and second half of kårikå 6. That is to say: the normal order is 6a-6b-
7a-7b, but the Yuktid¥pikå has 6a-7a-7b-6b. Again, the åryå metre is thoroughly 
disturbed in this manner.6 
 There can be no doubt that the author of the Yuktid¥pikå consciously changed the 
order of the ‘sËtras’ of the Såµkhya Kårikå; or perhaps: he consciously decided to 
comment upon them in an order which differs from the original one. The tradition 
preserved in all the other commentaries guarantees this sufficiently. This certainty 
makes the procedure of the [668] Yuktid¥pikå all the more interesting. It shows beyond 
reasonable doubt that at least some commentators in the first millennium felt free to 
change the order of the sËtras on which they commented. 
 The Såµkhya Kårikå is certainly not the only text the order of whose sËtras has 
been changed. It may however be the only text where there is so little occasion to look 
for alternative explanations. It is known, for example, that the Brahma sËtras occur at 
some places in a different order in the commentaries of Ía∫kara and Råmånuja.7 Here, 
too, it is reasonable to assume that someone changed the original order. However, the 
Brahma sËtras as they survive today are written in such a manner that it is virtually 
impossible to decide what this original order may have been. 
 
* * * 
                                                
6 K. Preisendanz has kindly sent me a portion of her forthcoming book, in which she mentions the 
possibility that the author of the Yuktid¥pikå did not (yet?) look upon SK 7 as a kårikå. She makes this 
suggestion because of the modified order of the kårikås, and because kårikå 7, in the interpretation of the 
Yuktid¥pikå, is invoked by an opponent. I find her suggestion nonetheless problematic, mainly because 
already the Såµkhya Kårikå as translated into Chinese by Paramårtha contains this kårikå. (For a 
discussion of the date of the Yuktid¥pikå, see Bronkhorst, 1985: 93-94.) Preisendanz's suggestion further 
seems to necessitate the assumption that the Yuktid¥pikå is not only older than all the other commentaries, 
but also that it was looked upon by the authors of the other commentaries as in some way authoritative. 
This again is hard to harmonize with the doctrinal differences which exist between the Yuktid¥pikå and 
some of the later commentaries. One such difference concerns the question whether the tanmåtras have 
one quality each, or an increasing number from one to five, depending on which tanmåtra one is talking 
about; and the related question whether the tanmåtras produce one element each, or whether they produce 
the elements jointly; see Bronkhorst, 1994, for details. The problems mentioned by Preisendanz can, of 
course, equally well be solved by the assumption that the author of the Yuktid¥pikå felt free, not only to 
comment upon the kårikås in a slightly modified order, but also to interpret one kårikå as representing the 
opinion of an opponent. 
7See Bronkhorst, 1981: 317-18 n. 6. 




Let us now turn to Vaiße∑ika sËtra (VS) 3.1.13.8 It reads: 
 
 åtmendriyamano'rthasannikar∑åd yan ni∑padyate tad anyat 
 
A number of authors, among them the oldest whose testimony has been preserved, see 
in this sËtra a definition of perception: 
 
(i) Dignåga remarks in his Pramåˆasamuccaya: "For the Vaiße∑ikas there is a definition, 
mentioned in the SËtra, of perception in respect to substance (dravya), [which is made 
meaningful] by a certain relation [to the preceding sËtras]. It says: ‘That [cognition] 
which is brought about by the contact of the soul (åtman), the sense (indriya), the mind 
(manas), and the object (artha) is [perception as] a separate one [of the pramåˆas]’."9 
There can be no doubt that the sËtra quoted by Dignåga is VS 3.1.13. Dignåga's remark 
to the extent that the sËtra "[is made meaningful] by a certain relation [to the preceding 
sËtras]" is noteworthy and must be kept in mind; we'll return to it later. 
[669] 
(ii) SiµhasËri quotes the following definition of perception in his Nyåyågamånusåriˆ¥ 
(ed. Jambuvijaya, vol. I, p. 110): 
 
åtmendriyamano'rthasannikar∑åd yan ni∑padyate tad anyat, åtmå manaså mana 
indriyeˆa indriyam artheneti catu∑†ayatrayadvayasannikar∑åd utpadyamånaµ 
pratyak∑am 
 
This is our Vaiße∑ika sËtra along with an explanation. The sËtra was apparently quoted 
— in order to be rejected — in Mallavådin's Dvådaßåra Nayacakra, which SiµhasËri 
comments.10 
 
(iii) The Yuktid¥pikå (p. 34, l. 29-30) cites this sËtra besides other definitions of 
perception. 
                                                
8This is its number in the version contained in Candrånanda's commentary, edited by Jambuvijaya (C). It 
is 3.1.20 in the version of Bha††a Våd¥ndra, also contained in the anonymous V®tti, both edited by A. 
Thakur (V), 3.1.18 in the version contained in Ía∫kara Mißra's Upaskåra, reproduced and translated in 
Sinha, 1911 (U). Where we use only one number, the reference is to C. The present sËtra contains the 
word manas in versions C and V and in a number of quotations of this sËtra in other works; manas is 
lacking in version U and in "one demonstrably wrong translation of the Pramåˆasamuccaya V®tti" 
(Isaacson, 1990: 27). 
9Translation Hattori, 1968: 42; the two Tibetan versions on the basis of which the translation was made 
are reproduced ibid. p. 198-199. 
10Be it noted in passing that SiµhasËri appears to quote in matters Vaiße∑ika usually from the Ka†and¥, a 
Vaiße∑ika work probably written before Dignåga's Pramåˆasamuccaya (see Bronkhorst, 1993). Do we 
have to conclude that also the present explanation given by SiµhasËri derives from the Ka†and¥? It is not 
possible at this point to address this question. 




(iv) Jayantabha††a's Nyåyamañjar¥ cites the sËtra in the following, slightly amplified, 
form (p. 280, l. 15-16): 
 
yad api kaißcit pratyak∑alak∑aˆam uktam ‘åtmendriyamano'rthasannikar∑åd yad 
utpadyate jñånaµ tad anyad anumånådibhya˙ pratyak∑am’ iti ... 
 
Here too there can be no doubt that the sËtra is read as a definition of perception. 
 
(v) The anonymous V®tti on the Vaiße∑ika SËtra edited by A. Thakur (1957), too, 
explains the sËtra as a definition of perception. So does the commentary by Bha††a 
Våd¥ndra edited by Thakur (1985), of which the former is an abbreviation. 
 
(vi) The anonymous Sarvasiddhåntapraveßaka, in its chapter on Vaiße∑ika, contains the 
following passage (Jambuvijaya, 1961: 145): 
 
åha pratyak∑alak∑aˆaµ kim iti cet, tadåha ‘åtmendriyamano'rthasannikar∑åd yan 
ni∑padyate tad anyat’/ asya vyåkhyå: åtmå manaså yujyate mana indriyeˆa indriyam 
artheneti/ tataß catu∑†ayasannikar∑åd gha†arËpådijñånam, trayasannikar∑åc chabde, 
dvayasannikar∑åt sukhådi∑u/ evaµ pratyak∑aµ nirdi∑†am/ 
[670] 
(vii) Akala∫ka's Tattvårtha-Vårttika (p. 53, l. 32.) cites VS 3.1.13 in an enumeration of 
definitions of perception. 
 
This interpretation, though supported by early authorities — among them our earliest —
, is not accepted by some Sanskrit authors, and by several modern scholars (Hattori, 
1966; Oetke, 1988: 303-319; Preisendanz, 1989: 150 f.; Nozawa, 1989: 71).11 They 
reject this interpretation for various reasons, which all boil down to one single factor: 
the context. The whole of Óhnika 3.1 is believed to be intended to prove the existence 
of the soul.12 It is in this way that the three commentators of the sËtras explain this 
section, and it is clear that a definition of perception in the midst of such an argument 
would be out of place. 
 Here the question can legitimately be raised whether we are entitled to discard the 
massive and ancient evidence provided by Dignåga and the other authors mentioned 
above on the basis of mere considerations of context. We have no surviving 
commentary on the Vaiße∑ika SËtra that is even approximately as old as Dignåga, nor 
                                                
11Honda (1990: 144 (29)) accepts the sËtra as a definition of perception. 
12Hattori is explicit about this (p. 897 (100)): "Although VS is not skilful in its arrangement of topics, 
there certainly is an order, which does not allow any arbitrary interpretation to be put on a sËtra." In 
Oetke's interpretation, 3.1.13 is a reply to an objection which finds expression in 3.1.7. The intervening 
sËtras are perhaps interpolated. 
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do we possess certain knowledge of what the context of VS 3.1.13 looked like during 
his time. (Recall that according to Dignåga the interpretation of 3.1.13 as a definition of 
perception is supported by its context; in the present situation of the text this can hardly 
be said to be the case.) Arguments based on context show a marked degree of 
confidence in the reliability of the SËtra text as it has been handed down to us, and this 
without supporting evidence. 
 The (present) context of VS 3.1.13, when looked at more closely, presents a 
number of peculiar features, which justify a certain suspicion with regard to the present 
order of the sËtras. Óhnika 3.1, as stated above, is believed to prove the existence of the 
soul (åtman). But strangely enough, the proof of the existence of the soul is again taken 
up in VS 3.2.4, without the slightest hint that this is the second time the topic is 
addressed.13 SËtras 3.2.1-3, which are situated between the two sections purportedly 
dealing with the proof of the soul, discuss the proof of the existence of the mind 
(manas). If [671] we follow the (relatively recent) indigenous commentaries and several 
modern scholars, we are asked to believe that Adhyåya 3 contains two sections dealing 
with the proof of the soul, which are separated, for no obvious reason, by a section 
which establishes the existence of the mind.14 
 The difficulties do no end here. SËtras 3.1.1-12, which allegedly establish the 
existence of the soul (åtman), do not once mention the word åtman, nor indeed any 
other word for soul. This constitutes a marked contrast with the second section 
concerned with the proof of the soul: VS 3.2.4 enumerates a number of åtmali∫gas, thus 
leaving no doubt as to its intentions. 
 The preceding observations show that the context of VS 3.1.13 is by far not as clear 
as some may maintain. It is instructive at this point to study how the first discussion on 
the existence of the soul is initiated. 
 The discussion starts with sËtra 3.1.1: prasiddhå indriyårthå˙. No commentator 
claims that this sËtra by itself introduces the topic of the soul. The sËtra is rather 
presented as an introduction to sËtra 3.1.2 (3.1.3 in the version of Bha††a Våd¥ndra) 
which, it is claimed, presents an inference proving the existence of the soul.15 SËtra 
3.1.2 begins with the word indriyårthaprasiddhi, which obviously refers back to sËtra 
3.1.1. What strikes us here, is that there is no need in this context of sËtra 3.1.1. In 
                                                
13In version V sËtra 3.2.4 concerns only the proof of the existence of the soul in others. This reading of 
the sËtra (pråˆåpånanime∑onme∑aj¥vanamanogat¥ndriyåntaravikårå˙ paråtmani li∫gam) disagrees however 
with the evidence of the Padårthadharmasa∫graha and its commentaries. See below. 
14Oetke (1988: 304) admits: "Dass das gesamte erste Óhnika des dritten Adhyåya dem Nachweis der 
Existenz einer Seele gewidmet ist, ist keineswegs so selbstverständlich, wie es von manchen indischen 
Kommentaren und europäischen Interpreten angenommen wird." The emphasis here is not, however, on 
Seele, but on Existenz, as is clear from the following remark on the very next page: "Es sieht so aus, dass 
die zu beweisende These nicht die Existenz einer Seele ist, sonder der Umstand, dass der Ótman ein (von 
den am Anfang des Werkes angeführten Padårthas) verschiedener Gegenstand ist." 
15Or rather, with Oetke, that the soul is different from the padårthas enumerated thus far. 
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presenting "the knowledge / establishment of senses and objects / objects of the senses" 
as logical ground for something else, presumably the soul (or the difference of the soul 
from other things), it is superfluous to have this preceded by another sËtra which states 
that "the senses and objects / objects of the senses are known / established". 
 The only reasonable explanation I can think of for the presence of 3.1.1 at this place 
is that this is a sËtra which the author of 3.1.2 (or 3.1.2-3) used as excuse and pretext for 
the introduction of one or more new sËtras. This is of course only possible if 3.1.2 
(3.1.2-3 in the case of Bha††a Våd¥ndra) is a later addition to the SËtra text, newly 
composed when 3.1.1 was already considered to constitute part and parcel of the 
traditionally accepted SËtra text. Seen in this way, 3.1.1 does not, and never did, 
constitute part of the proof of the soul, but it could be used as point of departure for 
such a discussion. 
[672] 
 It may be possible to explain in this way the use that was made of 3.1.1 by a later 
commentator. But what was its function before this commentator used it to introduce a 
discussion on the existence of the soul? An easy explanation can be provided if we are 
willing to consider that the commentator concerned did not only use 3.1.1 for his 
purposes, but moved it away from its original context. Explaining 3.1.1 in its present 
position is difficult, irrespectively of how one wishes to interpret the remainder of 
Óhnika 3.1. The fact that it deals with indriya and artha, suggests that it originally 
belonged between 3.1.13 — which deals with indriya, artha, manas and åtman — and 
the discussions of manas and åtman in sËtras 3.2.1 ff. If we remove 3.1.14 (which is 
suspect because it seems to presuppose that the preceding sËtra dealt with the existence 
of the soul),16 we arrive at the following sequence of sËtras (the variants in the other two 
versions are minor and do not affect the argument): 
 
3.1.13: åtmendriyamano'rthasannikar∑åd yan ni∑padyate tad anyat 
3.1.1: prasiddhå indriyårthå˙ 
3.2.1: åtmendriyårthasannikar∑e jñånasyåbhåvo bhåvaß ca manaso li∫gam 
3.2.2: dravyatvanityatve våyunå vyåkhyåte 
3.2.3: prayatnåyaugapadyåj jñånåyaugapadyåc caikaµ mana˙ 
3.2.4: pråˆåpånanime∑onme∑aj¥vanamanogat¥ndriyåntaravikårå˙ sukhadu˙khe 
icchådve∑au prayatnaß cety åtmali∫gåni 
3.2.5: dravyatvanityatve våyunå vyåkhyåte 
                                                
16SËtra 3.1.14 appears to deal with the proof of the existence of a soul in others. It cannot therefore have 
found its present position until after the rest of Óhnika 3.1 had been given an interpretation that concerns 
the existence of the soul. This does not necessarily imply that 3.1.14 is a late sËtra. Nozawa (1989) has 
argued that it is old, dating from the time when the soul was still thought of as of limited size. (See 
however Bronkhorst 1993a: 87 f. on the size of the soul in early Vaiße∑ika.) All we can say is that its 
present position cannot be all that old. 




This would then mean: 
 
-That which comes about as a result of contact (sannikar∑a) between soul (åtman), sense 
organ (indriya), mind (manas) and object (artha), is a different [kind of cognition] (viz., 
perception) (3.1.13) 
-[From among these four factors] sense organs and objects are well-known [and need no 
further explanation] (3.1.1) 
[673] 
-The inferential mark [for the existence] of a mind is that there is [sometimes] cognition 
and [sometimes] not, even though there is contact between soul, sense organ and object 
(3.2.1) 
-The fact that [mind] is a substance and eternal is explained by [the same arguments as 
in the case of] wind17 (3.2.2) 
-There is [only] one mind [in each body] because [several] efforts do not occur 
simultaneously, nor do [several] cognitions (3.2.3) 
-The inferential marks [for the existence] of a soul are: breathing in and breathing out, 
shutting and opening the eyes, life, movement of the mind, the modifications of the 
other senses, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and volition (3.2.4) 
-The fact that [soul] is a substance and eternal is explained by [the same arguments as in 
the case of] wind18 (3.2.5) 
 
This sequence makes sense, is coherent, and even clear enough to allow us to interpret 
the sËtras without the help of a commentary. 
 Recall that the reason why someone should comment upon 3.1.1 at its present 
position, i.e., at the beginning of Adhyåya 3, is quite clear: this allowed him to address 
the question of the existence of the soul at that place. We will see below why this could 
be a concern to this commentator. 
 First, however, we must consider the question what originally preceded sËtra 
3.1.13. If we accept, with the ancient witnesses cited above, that this sËtra was a 
definition of perception, the question can be answered with a fair amount of confidence. 
The sËtra must have been preceded by a related discussion.This is shown by the peculiar 
form of 3.1.13. Recall that this definition of perception does not mention the word 
‘perception’; instead it has anyat ‘[something] different / the other one’. It clearly 
continues a discussion, which distinguished (at least) two kinds of knowledge or 
                                                
17This refers to sËtras 2.1.11 adravyavattvåd dravyam and 2.1.13 adravyavattvena nityatvam uktam, both 
of which occur in the discussion of wind. 
18See preceding note. 
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cognition (jñåna(?); or perhaps pramåˆa? see below). The form of 3.1.13 indicates that 
it was preceded, in all probability, by one or more sËtras about inferential knowledge. 
This is what Jayantabha††a suggests in so many words (see above),19 and indeed, even in 
its present shape the Vaiße∑ika SËtra has some sËtras somehow dealing with inference 
immediately preceding 3.1.13. 
[674] 
 It would be sheer temerity to pretend to be able to reconstruct the original form and 
history of sËtras 3.1.3-12. One thing seems however certain: sËtra 3.1.13 was once 
preceded by sËtras dealing with inferential knowledge. The word anyat in 3.1.13, 
moreover, suggests that at one time these preceding sËtras contained some such neuter 
noun as jñånam. No such noun is at present to be found in 3.1.3-12. Nor do any of these 
sËtras seem to introduce, or define, inferential knowledge. 
 Here, however, the following is to be observed. The first part of sËtra 3.1.8 reads: 
saµyogi, samavåyi, ekårthasamavåyi, virodhi ca. The commentators seem to think that 
these adjectives characterize the word li∫ga ‘inferential mark’, which is not mentioned 
in the sËtra. But there is another sËtra (9.18) which reads: asyedaµ kåryaµ kåraˆaµ 
sambandhi ekårthasamavåyi virodhi ceti lai∫gikam. The similarities with 3.1.8 are 
striking, yet 9.18 does not speak of inferential marks, but of inferential knowledge. It 
can be translated: "Inferential [knowledge is characterized by the relation:] ‘this is the 
effect of that’, ‘this is the cause of that’, ‘this is related to that’, ‘this inheres in the same 
object as that’, ‘this is opposed to that’." It is therefore conceivable that 3.1.8, too, 
introduced inferential knowledge. The person who changed the order of the sËtras may 
have adjusted sËtra 3.1.8 to his purposes by trimming it. Alternatively we may consider 
the possibility that the scribe who extracted the sËtra from its commentary failed to 
extract the whole sËtra. 
 Whatever the exact original shape of the sËtras, it seems probable that Adhyåya 3,20 
prior to the changes pointed out above, discussed inferential and perceptual knowledge 
before turning to the mind (manas) and the soul (åtman). Mind and soul being the last 
two of the nine substances (dravya) enumerated in sËtra 1.1.4, Adhyåya 3 completes the 
discussion of the substances, the earlier ones having been enumerated in Adhyåya 2, as 
follows: earth (p®thiv¥) 2.1.1; water (ap) 2.1.2; fire (tejas) 2.1.3; wind (våyu) 2.1.4; ether 
(åkåßa) 2.1.5; wind 2.1.9 f.; ether 2.1.26 f.; time (kåla) 2.2.6 f.; space (diß) 2.2.12 f. 
 Why was the treatment of inferential and perceptual knowledge inserted into the 
discussion of the substances? The answer is obvious: sËtra 3.2.1, which proves the 
existence of the mind, refers back to the definition of perception. Even when there is 
                                                
19 Similarly Jinendrabuddhi; see below. 
20It is not, of course, claimed here that the original Vaiße∑ika SËtra was already divided into Adhyåyas 
and Óhnikas. 
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contact (sannikar∑a) between soul (åtman), sense organ (indriya) and object (artha), 
there may or may not be knowledge; this fact indicates the existence of a fourth factor, 
viz., the mind [675] (manas).21 The fact that the soul is dealt with after the mind is 
explained by the fact that sËtra 3.2.4, which proves the existence of the soul, presents as 
one of the arguments the movement of the mind (manogati). 
 What was the purpose of the commentator who changed the order of the sËtras? 
Again it is not difficult to divine the answer. This commentator apparently wanted the 
discussion of the substances to continue without interruption. After the treatment of 
space (diß) the next substance mentioned in sËtra 1.1.4 was the soul (åtman). He 
introduced this topic in the way we now know, i.e., before the mind. 
 One final question must be addressed: When did the change of order take place? 
Better perhaps: when was the commentary written which commented upon the sËtras in 
their modified order? Here22 we have to consider the following statement in 
Praßastapåda's Padårthadharmasa∫graha (Ki p. 97 l. 25-26, Ny p. 219 l. 3, Vy I p. 134 l. 
17-18): åtmali∫gådhikåre buddhyådaya˙ prayatnåntå˙ siddhå˙ "In the section on 
inferential marks of the soul [the qualities] from consciousness (buddhi) to effort 
(prayatna) have been established." The early commentators on the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha all agree that this statement refers to the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. 
Ír¥dhara (Ny p. 219 l. 9) specifies that the reference is to the pråˆåpånådisËtra. Udayana 
provides the following commentary (Ki p. 98 l. 10-11): pråˆådisËtre buddhyådaya˙ 
prayatnåntå˙ siddhå˙/ yady api buddhis tatra kaˆ†haraveˆa nåsti tathåpi sukhådaya eva 
svakåraˆatayå tåm åk∑ipanti/ "In the pråˆådisËtra [the qualities] from consciousness to 
effort have been established. Although consciousness does not figure explicitly in that 
[sËtra], [the qualities] happiness (sukha) etc. suggests it as it is their cause." These 
remarks show that the three early commentators on the Padårthadharmasa∫graha, as 
perhaps Praßastapåda himself, knew sËtra 3.2.4 more or less in the form which we find 
in versions C and U (pråˆåpånanime∑onme∑aj¥vanamanogat¥ndriyåntaravikårå˙ 
sukhadu˙khe icchådve∑au prayatnaß cety åtmali∫gåni / sukhadu˙khecchådve∑aprayatnåß 
cåtmano li∫gåni), and not as we find it in V 
(pråˆåpånanime∑onme∑aj¥vanamanogat¥ndriyåntaravikårå˙ paråtmani li∫gam). But there 
is a problem connected with the identification proposed by the commentators, as 
pointed out by Udayana. SËtra 3.2.4 does not mention consciousness (buddhi). 
Udayana's solution to the prob[676]lem is not convincing. A far more convincing 
solution presents itself if we assume that Praßastapåda already knew the beginning of 
                                                
21VS 3.2.1: åtmendriyårthasannikar∑e jñånasyåbhåvo bhåvaß ca manaso li∫gam. 
22Hattori (1966: 893 (104)) has already drawn attention to the parallelism that exists between the 
interpretations of VS 3.1.1-2 offered in the three oldest commentaries, and a passage in the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha (Ki p. 84 & 86, Ny p. 176, 179 & 182, Vy p. 133-34). 
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Adhyåya 3 more or less in the form in which we know it. SËtra 3.1.2 (3), in particular, 
uses indriyårthaprasiddhi as inferential mark to prove the existence of the soul. 
Indriyårthaprasiddhi is, of course, a kind of knowledge (jñåna) or consciousness.23 SËtra 
3.1.13, too, is interpreted by some commentators (C, U) as presenting consciousness as 
an inferential mark of the soul. 
 There is no evidence, on the other hand, to believe that already the author of the 
Carakasaµhitå knew the present order and interpretation of Adhyåya 3 of the Vaiße∑ika 
SËtra. This text enumerates a number of inferential marks of the highest self (li∫gåni 
paramåtmana˙) in Íår¥rasthåna 1.70-72.24 A. Comba (1987: 54 f.) has pointed out that 
this enumeration draws upon two sources, the one being VS 3.2.4, the other 
Yåjñavalkyasm®ti 3. 174-175 (Stenzler, 1849: p. 99 of the edition).25 The elements of 
VS 3.2.4, Comba suggests, were taken as basis, to which the elements of the 
Yåjñavalkyasm®ti have been added. The fact that buddhi ‘consciousness’ figures in the 
list of the Carakasaµhitå does not, therefore indicate that Óhnika 3.1 of the Vaiße∑ika 
SËtra was read and understood as it is at present, for buddhi occurs in the list of the 
Yåjñavalkyasm®ti. The fact that buddhi is added after the elements occurring in VS 
3.2.4, agrees with the general procedure of the author of the Carakasaµhitå, drawn 
attention to by Comba, to add the elements of the Yåjñavalkyasm®ti after those taken 
from the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. 
 It looks, then, as if the commentator who used sËtra 3.1.1 as an introduction to a 
discussion of the proof of the soul, lived before Praßastapåda, though perhaps not very 
long before him. Some facts suggest that his new interpretation of the sËtras of Óhnika 
3.1 could not impose itself immediately. There is, on the one hand, the ongoing tradition 
of authors who look upon VS 3.1.13 as a definition of perception. Equally interesting is 
the fact that both the commentators Ír¥dhara and Udayana fail to understand that [677] 
Praßastapåda's buddhi in the statement cited above refers to sËtra 3.1.2 and/or 13 
(Vyomaßiva's position cannot be determined with certainty). Do we have to conclude 
that they still knew the earlier interpretation, perhaps even the earlier order of the sËtras 
in Óhnika 3.1? Did the two interpretations of Óhnika 3.1 exist for a while side by side? 
In this connection it is interesting to cite Hattori's (1968: 134-35 n. 4.3) paraphrase of 
some remarks from Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on Dignåga's Pramåˆasamuccaya: 
                                                
23This is precisely what Ía∫kara Mißra says in his Upaskåra (p. 85 l. 17-19): yady api jñånam eva li∫gam 
iha vivak∑itam tathåp¥ndriyårthaprasiddhe rËpådisåk∑åtkårasya prasiddhataratayå tådrËpyeˆaiva 
li∫gatvam uktam. 
24 Caraka Íå. 1.70-72: pråˆåpånau nime∑ådyå j¥vanaµ manaso gati˙/ indriyåntarasaµcåra˙ preraˆaµ 
dhåraˆaµ ca yat// deßåntaragati˙ svapne pañcatvagrahaˆaµ tathå/ d®∑†asya dak∑iˆenåk∑ˆå 
savyenåvagamas tathå// icchå dve∑a˙ sukhaµ du˙khaµ prayatnaß cetanå dh®ti˙/ buddhi˙ sm®tir aha∫kåro 
li∫gåni paramåtmana˙//. 
25 Yåjñavalkyasm®ti 3. 174-75 (ed. Stenzler): aha∫kåra˙ sm®tir medhå dve∑o buddhi˙ sukhaµ dh®ti˙/ 
indriyåntarasañcåra icchå dhåraˆaj¥vite// svarga˙ svapnaß ca bhåvånåµ preraˆaµ manaso gati˙/ nime∑aß 
cetanåyatna ådånaµ påñcabhautikam//. 
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"Jinendrabuddhi remarks that the relation of VS, III, i, 13, to the preceding sËtras is 
variously interpreted by different commentators. He refers to the following two 
interpretations: (1) The universal apprehension (prasiddhi) is nothing other than 
knowledge (jñåna). It therefore follows that it is an attribute (guˆa), and is non-eternal 
(anitya). That which is non-eternal has a cause (kåraˆa). Thus the sËtra in question 
indicates the cause of knowledge and also mentions that knowledge as an effect is 
different from its causes, as a pot as an effect is different from its cause, clay. (2) Since 
the preceding sËtras explain anumåna, one might consider anumåna as the only 
pramåˆa. VS, III, i, 13, forestalls this by mentioning pratyak∑a as a separate pramåˆa. 
As Jinendrabuddhi says, VS, III, i, 13, can be understood as providing the definition of 
pratyak∑a according to the second interpretation but not the first. Dignåga's implication 
when he says ‘by a certain relation [to the preceding sËtras]’ (kenacit sambandhena) 
should be understood as referring to these different interpretation; 
[Pramåˆasamuccaya†¥kå] [Sde-dge ed., Tohoku, No. 4268] 53a.3-53b.1 ([Peking ed., 
Tibetan Tripitaka, No. 5766] 59b.4-60a.3)." Note in particular the remark, in the second 
interpretation, "since the preceding sËtras explain anumåna" (rtags las byung ba tshad 
mar ba rjod la, which Muni Jambuvijaya (1961: 174 l. 5) translates into Sanskrit 
lai∫gikapramåˆe 'bhihite). This seems to confirm our earlier supposition that a 
discussion of inferential knowledge (lai∫gikaµ jñånam; perhaps better lai∫gikaµ 
pramåˆam?) once preceded sËtra 3.1.13, not a discussion of the inferential mark (li∫ga) 
as maintained, for example, by Candrånanda. Also Akala∫ka must have known two 
interpretations of VS 3.1.13, as has been pointed out by K. Preisendanz (1989: 152).26 
 Preisendanz (1989: 151 n. 39) also refers to *Vimalåk∑a's commentary on MËla-
Madhyamaka-Kårikå 14.1, translated by Walleser from the Chinese into German (1912: 
90). She observes that here "VS 3.1.13 is obvi-[678]ously used to demonstrate the 
difference between perception, perceptible object, and perceiver". She thinks that this is 
"a related line of interpretation" to her own, in which "3.1.13 most probably serves to 
show that cognition, here specifically perception, is different (anyat) from the soul, the 
latter being a factor involved in its production" (p. 150). This, if correct, would push the 
reordering and reinterpretation of Óhnika 3.1 back to a date well before Kumåraj¥va 
(344-413), who translated this commentary into Chinese. 
 However, *Vimalåk∑a's remarks do not force us to draw such a conclusion. It is true 
that an opponent in his commentary — presumably a Vaiße∑ika — uses VS 3.1.13 to 
                                                
26Compare Akala∫ka's remark cited above with Tattvårtha-Vårttika p. 46 l. 6-8: yasya matam — åtmano 
jñånåkhyo guˆa˙, tasmåc cårthåntarabhËta˙, "åtmendriyamanorthasannikar∑åt yan ni∑padyate tad anyat" 
iti vacanåd iti ...; also p. 50 l. 9-14. 
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demonstrate the difference between perception, perceptible object, and perceiver.27 But 
this can very well be done, even if one looks upon this sËtra as a definition of 
perception. Also when interpreted as a definition of perception, this sËtra distinguishes 
between the self (åtman), the object of knowledge (artha), and the perceptual knowledge 
which results from their contact (sannikar∑a) with the mind (manas) and the sense organ 
(indriya). We must therefore conclude that *Vimalåk∑a's remarks do not constitute 
evidence that the "new" interpretation of sËtra 3.1.13 existed already in the fourth 
century C.E. 
 Similar remarks should be made with regard to the following passage in Vasu's 
commentary on the Íataßåstra:28 
 
The unbeliever says: A disciple of UlËka, who reads the Vaiße∑ika SËtra, says that 
knowledge and åtman are different, and that therefore the åtman does not fall into 
the state of non-eternity, and yet that it is not without knowledge. Why? 
"Because åtman and knowledge are united just like the possessor of an ox." 
For example, if a man is united with an ox, he is called the possessor of an ox. In 
the same way, from the union of the åtman, the senses, the manas, and the objects, 
to the åtman there is an occurrence of knowledge. Because of the union of the 
åtman with knowledge, the åtman is called a possessor of knowledge. 
[679] 
Here VS 3.1.13 is used to prove the difference between the self and knowledge. This 
can be done, even if 3.1.13 is considered a definition of perception. 
 
 We have come to the end of this article. It must be admitted that the reconstruction 
of the context and of the interpretation here presented of VS 3.1.13 cannot be definitely 
proved to be correct. They do, however, solve a number of problems which other 
interpretations had failed to solve. The least one can deduce from them is that the 
arguments which discard the interpretation of 3.1.13 as a definition of perception on the 
basis of its context are not conclusive. VS 3.1.13 can be interpreted as a definition of 
perception, as maintained by our earliest witnesses; and other difficulties surrounding 
Adhyåya 3 can be solved, if only we are willing to consider the possibility that the order 
of sËtras which we find in the surviving versions of the Vaiße∑ika SËtra may in one 
point deviate from their original order. This possibility in its turn, as we have seen, is 
supported by the fact that other commentators on SËtra texts are known to have 
                                                
27See Walleser, 1912: 90: "Frage: Selbst (åtman), Vorstellung (manas), Sinn (indriya), Sinnesbereich 
(gocara): da (diese) vier Dinge vereinigt sind, ist Entstehen des Erkennens. Man kann Krug, Tuch usw., 
alle Dinge erkennen. Deshalb ist Sehen, zu Sehendes, Seher." The Chinese is to be found T. 1564 (vol. 
30) p. 19a l. 13-15. 
28 I thank M. Nozawa, who drew my attention to this passage, and provided me with a translation — 
different from Tucci's (1929: 23-24) — which I here reproduce (with minor modifications). Nozawa 
points out that the latter part of the underlined portion (which corresponds to VS 3.1.13) follows Ui's and 
Hatani's Japanese translation. An alternative translation might be "the åtman arises as a possessor of 
knowledge". The Chinese occurs T. 1569 (vol. 30) p. 171b l. 7-12.  
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occasionally changed the order of sËtras on which they comment. In view of all this, we 
may conclude with a variant of an observation made by Oetke (1988: 310): The 
hypothesis that the sËtras of Óhnika 3.1 have reached us in their original order may not 
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